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Introduction 
It is difficult to analyse private universities in Europe (including those that 
are part of the EUEREK case studies) in the context of entrepreneurialism in 
the form the concept has emerged in the basic literature on the subject and 
available case studies. The private sector in higher education in Europe, with 
several exceptions (e.g. Portugal and Spain) — from the point of view of both 
numbers of institutions, share of enrolments in the sector, and study areas 
offered — has been an educational phenomenon of the transition countries. 
In some countries (e.g. Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands), nominally 
private institutions are funded in practice with public money, in various 
forms and under different umbrellas. 
At the same time, the conceptual framework currently used to analyse 
entrepreneurialism in higher education seems somehow restricted in use 
to public sector institutions, and rightly so. Very few scholars ever refer to 
private institutions in their discussions of academic entrepreneurship. And if 
they do, they often mean selected top US universities (as Clark refers to 
Stanford and MIT in Sustaining Change in Universities — but in the context of 
public institutions briefly studied, such as the University of Michigan at Ann 
Arbor, UCLA, North Carolina State University, and Georgia Institute of 
Technology: Clark, 2004a: 133-66; Clark discusses also the Catholic University 
of Chile, ibid.: 110-21). Clark's (1998) classic five case studies in Creating 
Entrepreneurial Universities were all about European public universities and 
the only one that stood out — Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden -
had indeed 'opted-out' of the Swedish public education system but has 
remained funded by the state. In Europe, not only is the experience of 
private higher education very limited, but the emergent concepts related to 
entrepreneurialism have derived from analytical work on the public sector 
and have rarely touched on the private sector. Shattock (2004b) and Williams 
(2004b) applied a concept of `entrepreneurialism' to (somehow alien) uni-
versities in transition countries — in Russia. But again they were public 
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universities. Sporn (2001), while analysing 'adaptive universities', focused on 
four public (the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, UC Berkeley, St. Gal-
len Universität in Switzerland, and Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien in Austria) 
but also on two private institutions, including New York University and a 
vocationally orientated university in Europe, Università Bocconi in Milan. 
This chapter is based, in more theoretical terms, on the conceptual 
work on 'entrepreneurial', 'enterprising', and 'proactive' universities by 
Clark (1998, 2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2005), 'self-reliant' and 'enterprising' — as 
well as; more generally, 'successful' — universities by Shattock (2000, 2003, 
2004a, 2004b, 2005) and Williams (2004b), and Sporn's (1999a, 1999b, 
2001) notion of 'adaptive' universities. In empirical terms, it is based on 
case studies of entrepreneurialism in universities drawn from the EUEREK 
study on entrepreneurialism in private institutions within the context of 
what Clark, Shattock, Williams, and Sporn suggest for the study of public 
institutions'. 
The EUEREK case studies of private institutions included the University of 
Buckingham (UK) Jönköping University (Sweden), TCUM — Trade Coopera-
tive University of Moldova (Moldova), UCH — the Cardenal Herrera Uni-
versity (Spain), WSHIG — the Academy of Hotel Management and Catering 
Industry (Poland), and the University of Pereslavl (Russia). They are all 
relatively new institutions, with almost all of them being founded in the 
1990s — in the UK (1976), Poland (1993), Russia (1993, transformed from a 
state-funded think tank founded in 1984), Sweden (1994, one of three 
`foundation' universities), Moldova (1993), and Spain (2000). Almost all are 
located outside of capital cities. The reasons for founding them varied, 
from being political/ideological (UK), an individual's passion (Poland), 
political/regional considerations (Sweden, Russia), and religious interests 
(Spain). What is crucial from the perspective of entrepreneurialism is that 
they represent, in general, a fundamental reliance on tuition fees as a source 
of income and a limited reliance on, and access to, external research funding 
(the exception is Sweden) 2. Small research groups are formed in the UK and 
Spanish examples but no major financial impact attributable to them is 
actually reported. Also no endowment income is reported, and sometimes 
there is a strong reliance on bank loans (Poland, UK). In almost all cases 
(especially in interviews), such characteristic expressions as 'to survive', 
`survival', 'uncertainty about the future', occur. The Spanish EUEREK case 
study confirms that private institutions can regard themselves as entrepre-
neurial but there are discrepancies between descriptions (and feelings) 
expressed by academic staff on the one hand and managers, rectors, or deans 
on the other. With such small exceptions, private institutions view themselves 
as less entrepreneurial than public ones. In Poland, Russia, and Moldova, no 
feelings about being specifically entrepreneurial were reported — instead, 
there are references to being 'innovative', 'unique', and so on (especially 
in comparison with some old-style public institutions). Another common 
feature is that they are very small or relatively small institutions within their 
respective national higher education systems (of a size from a few hundred 
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students in the UK and Russia to a few thousand students in Moldova, 
Poland, Sweden, and Spain). In most of the case studies, they are vocation-
ally orientated and have small research ambitions (and, at the same time, 
small research funding opportunities). Often, they are born out of visions 
and ambitions of entrepreneurial individuals (academics and non-academics 
alike in Poland and Russia). 
Regarding the growth of the private sector generally, as Levy notes, the 
twentieth century norm and persisting public norm is state funding of public 
universities (and overwhelmingly private sources of funding for private 
institutions). State subsidies for private institutions are rare and the 
examples of India, Belgium, and the Netherlands (as well as Swedish 'foun-
dation universities') may call into question the designation of private (Levy, 
2006: 10). The global demographics of private higher education is such that 
the major centre of the sector is East Asia, with about 80% of all students 
enrolled in private universities in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Phil-
ippines; in the United States, surprisingly, only 20%; in Western Europe, on 
average 10% or much less; in Latin America, over 50% in Brazil, Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela; and finally in the transition countries, 
and some post-Soviet republics — where the most rapid growth took place 
after 1989 — up to 30% (on the private sector in Europe, see in particular 
two recent fundamental edited volumes: The Rising Role and Relevance of 
Private Higher Education in Europe, edited by Wells et al., 2007; and Private 
Higher Education in Post-Communist Europe: In Search of Legitimacy, edited 
by Slantcheva and Levy, 2007). As Levy puts it, 'where public budgets do 
not meet the still rapidly growing demand for higher education, students 
pay for alternatives' (Levy, 2002: 4) — and this is what happened in several 
transition countries. In most of them, both public and private higher educa-
tion enrolments in general, and the share of the private sector in overall 
enrolments in particular, have changed dramatically over the last 15 years. 
While Western Europe has not in general witnessed the emergence (or 
substantial strengthening, depending on the country) of the private 
sector in higher education, in several post-communist transition countries in 
Europe, for a variety of reasons, the private sector emerged as a tough 
competitor to the most often traditional, elitist, faculty-centred, and quite 
often inaccessible public sector. The differences between the transition 
countries are significant, however; while in Croatia and the Slovak Republic 
private institutions enrol as few as 3.0-4.6% of the countries' student bodies, 
the private sectors in Estonia, Poland, and Romania enrol almost one-third 
of all students. Other countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia have 
enrolments of about 15% (Slantcheva and Levy, 2007: 3)3. 
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The diversified funding base: possible sources 
of income 
There are several ways in which the case studies can be considered. Sporn 
discusses five factors enhancing adaptation at specialized European uni-
versities that lead in five directions: externally focused mission, differenti-
ated structure, collegial management, institutional autonomy, and diversified 
funding (Sporn, 2001: 27); Shattock discusses six key words highlighting the 
characteristics that successful universities have to demonstrate: they are 
competitiveness, opportunism, income generation and cost reduction, rele-
vance, excellence, and reputation (Shattock, 2000: 96-103). We could discuss 
the private sector represented in the case studies in the context of the two 
above sets of features, but we will base our further analysis on Clark's 
`pathways to transformation', revisiting his classic formulations. Clark ana-
lysed five (entrepreneurial, innovative, enterprising) European universities 
in action, transforming themselves over a period of 10-15 years, within a 
common conceptual structure. In brief, according to Clark (1998, 2004a), 
the entrepreneurial universities studied — universities systematically seeking 
to transform themselves — show five elements that differentiate them from 
others and which form an `irreducible minimum': a strengthened steering 
core, an expanded developmental periphery, a diversified funding base, a 
stimulated academic heartland, and an integrated entrepreneurial culture 
(Clark, 1998: 5). Clark's criteria are organizational characteristics rather 
than definitions. The five elements, or generalized pathways of university 
transformations, according to Clark: 
rise up from the realities of particular institutions to highlight features 
shared across a set of universities, but at the same time they still allow for 
local variation . . . Four elements are highly structural: we observe them 
in tangible offices, budgets, outreach centres, and departments. Only 
the more ephemeral element of institutional idea, floating in the 
intangible realm of intention, belief, and culture, is hard to pin down. 
Emphasizing manifest structures helps greatly in explaining the devel-
opment of organized social systems . . . Significant change in universities 
has definite organizational footing. (Clark, 1998: 128) 
Let us begin with the diversified funding base of entrepreneurial uni-
versities. There are three streams of income: mainline support from govern-
ment, funds from governmental research councils, and all other sources 
lumped together by Clark as 'third-stream income' (Clark, 2004a: 77). A 
widening of the financial base becomes essential for public universities, and 
discretionary funds are particularly important for university transformations 
(Clark, 1998: 6). 
Transformations in funding at public universities in the last twenty years 
have been towards the second and the third streams of income. In the 
specific case of European private institutions, it is crucial to underscore the 
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role of the third stream (all other, largely non-governmental, sources 
of income), as most of them in Europe are cut off from major forms of 
governmental funds. Private institutions in Europe find it hard to be entre-
preneurial, and to have entrepreneurially minded academics — because their 
faculty and academic units do not compete globally or nationally for outside 
research funding. And the role of competition with others — institutions and 
individual academics alike — is fundamental to the entrepreneurial character 
of an academic institution. We mean here both internal competition (for 
research and other development funds) and external competition for other 
outside funds. At entrepreneurial universities, a considerable element of 
managerial practice is devoted to managing competing units (and acade-
mics) in terms of human resources, non-core external finance, and the result-
ing tensions between academic units, between the centre and departments, 
through resource allocation utilizing, for example, various top-slicing and 
cross-subsidizing techniques. With competitive research funding available in 
entrepreneurial universities, as most case studies confirm, there are no limits 
to the academic financial expectations, and inventing and re-inventing fair 
and transparent funding formulae for departments and the centre are 
critical: if procedures are non-transparent, or unfair to some academic units, 
management loses a lot of time and energy in managing tensions which in 
other circumstances would not appear. 
From the perspective of entrepreneurialism, a negative aspect to the 
development of the private institutions studied is their status as teaching 
institutions only. Case studies of Polish and Russian (as well as Macedonian 
and Ukrainian, outside of the EUEREK project) — private — entrepreneurially 
minded universities show that the road to excellence in research is difficult 
to follow, especially with external funding being scarce at the beginning, 
but the prestige and reputation of an institution accumulates when signifi-
cant research is being done, including especially internationally relevant 
research. Only a few private institutions in Poland have reached that level -
but today they have the best graduates and the top PhD students (in the 
Polish context, these institutions are allowed to offer PhD studies in selected 
areas, in acknowledgement of the quality of the core staff they employ and 
the high national rating of their research output; WSHIG, being a vocational 
institution, does not have research ambitions). Not surprisingly, investing in 
research brings more, and especially better, students to these institutions. 
The access of these private institutions to public subsidies is very limited 
and private R&D investments in private higher education institutions are 
marginal (again the Swedish case is exceptional and testifies to different 
senses of 'privateness' of higher education — at Jönköping University, the 
level of public subsidies is equal to that of public universities; in the Russian 
case of Pereslavl, public research funding is provided for its research part, 
the Institute of Programming Systems of the Russian Academy of Sciences). 
In more general terms, the financial diversification of an institution is also 
healthy academically: the general rule is simple — as Clark put it, 'it is better 
to have more money than less', or elsewhere: 'more income is always needed: 
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universities are expensive and good universities are very expensive' (Clark, 
1998: 26). The diversified funding base of an entrepreneurial university 
means a portfolio of patrons (national and international, private and public, 
long- and short-term) to share inevitable rising costs. Entrepreneurial uni-
versities aggressively seek third-stream sources, and it has become a very 
powerful trend in the Netherlands, the UK, Sweden, and Finland, as well as 
in several transition countries including Poland. Internal university reforms 
and restructuring, including closures and mergers of academic units, are 
increasingly 'finance-driven' (rather than, for example, 'equity driven'). 
Third-stream income is becoming crucial for public institutions; some com-
ponents are also fundamental for the vitality (development or survival) of 
private institutions. 
The case studies in Clark (1998) from the University of Warwick in the UK, 
including Shattock's 'earned income policy', and from Twente University in 
the Netherlands, are crucial to understanding the phenomenon of entre-
preneurialism because they demonstrate the importance of all academic 
units being involved in seeking external funding for research (consulting, 
patents and licences, short courses, and from fees paid by international 
students). Separate units increasingly become separate small academic and 
business units, 'rewarded' and 'punished' for their entrepreneurialism (as 
Williams noted, 'managers who take risks and are successful are rewarded. 
Failure and passivity are penalized' (Williams, 2004a: 87)). The culture of 
entrepreneurialism, an irreducible element of entrepreneurial organizations 
according to Clark, means that virtually all units are involved, including the 
social sciences and the humanities. In Poland and other transition countries, 
by contrast, most entrepreneurial units were social science departments only 
— especially political sciences, sociology, psychology, and business-related 
(but not strictly economic) areas. The number of private institutions rose 
from 3 in 1991 to 250 in 2002, 301 in 2005, and 315 in 2006 (GUS, 2006: 20), 
of which the vast majority were economics related. Since the beginning of 
the 1990s, the private sector has changed the educational landscape in 
Poland beyond recognition: in the academic year 2006/07, almost one-third 
of the 2 million student body (32%) chose private higher education institu-
tions. The Warwick example of financial management shows that what is 
crucial is to look outside the university for opportunities and to regard 
academic units from a financial as well as an academic perspective as if they 
were small business units. 
The possible new sources of income for entrepreneurial universities in 
Europe include support from other public agencies, support from large busi-
ness firms, engagement with small- and medium-sized firms, philanthropic 
foundations, professional associations, university endowment income, uni-
versity fundraising from alumni and willing supporters, student tuition and 
fees for foreign students, graduate students, and continuing education stu-
dents. In the entrepreneurial framework of academic thinking, customer-
students of the emergent private sector are happier to pay what is required 
and get what they want than to pay less and get less. Private institutions as 
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providers of services appear to have a better reputation if they do not under-
price and undercharge for their services, such as renting conference centres, 
sports facilities, and so on (in the UK, the phenomenon is called the academic 
low price culture'). This is prevalent at most public, even entrepreneurially 
minded, universities in Europe; on the other hand, many private universities 
charge full recovery costs plus a substantial surplus, both for teaching stu-
dents and for renting their facilities to outsiders. The Polish case where there 
were 315 private universities in 2006 but where only a few have gone bankrupt 
in the past few years and where private universities are aggressively developing 
their infrastructure and their study offers, confirms that the phenomenon of 
underpricing is absent in the private sector. In Russia, as Shattock stresses, 
`an extremely important contribution to Russian university entrepreneuria-
lism was the central government's decision to allow universities to admit 
fee-paying students' (Shattock, 2004a: 31); it is like the Polish case, with some 
differences (such as legal limitations in the number of part-time fee-paying 
students: up to 50% of all non-fee-paying regular students at an institution 
as a whole). 
Other sources of new income for Clark's entrepreneurial universities 
included earned income from campus operations, academically driven activ-
ities plus spin-off companies and self-financing activities, and royalty income 
from patented and licensed inventions and intellectual property. Incentives 
for staff and academic units to be entrepreneurial rather than to be tradi-
tionalist are crucial — this is confirmed by numerous examples in Europe. 
Incentives do not have to be financial only; they can be reputational (indi-
vidual distinction), academic career-related, and time-related (e.g. smaller 
teaching loads for those successful in research). Certainly, too heavy top-
slicing of additional outside income is an inhibitor to entrepreneurialism of 
both units and academics. As stressed by Williams and Kitaev (2005: 139), 
there is a balance between an individual's gains and an institution's gains, 
both in financial and in reputational terms. 
Thus, in general, the fundamental dimension of an entrepreneurial uni-
versity — having a diversified funding base — does not seem to work for the 
private institutions studied. Their ability (and opportunities) to use the 
`third source' of income, especially (perhaps most welcome) 'university-
generated' income, is very limited, as confirmed by detailed statistical data in 
the relevant case studies. Their high degree of financial dependence on a 
single source of income (namely, student fees) makes them easily prone to 
financial problems (Buckingham University differs in this respect from the 
other private institutions studied and is closer to public universities: while its 
income from fees in 2004 was 70%, its income from research reached 11%). 
At the same time, it is critical to note the dependence of public institutions 
on fees in the transition countries as well: from among the case study institu-
tions, in Poland fees were between 18% of income for Poznan University and 
41% for Poznan University of Economics, while in Moldova, the structure of 
funding of public universities make them quite similar to private institutions 
(and makes the very public/private distinction blurred): the percentage of 
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income from fees in the three public institutions in Moldova is between 71% 
and 83%. Not surprisingly, a high or very high reliance of private institutions 
on fees is inversely proportional to their reliance on research funds. While 
they lead the list for the highest percentage of income from fees (in 2004, 
UCH in Spain 99%, WSHIG in Poland 94%, Moldova State University 83%, 
AESM in Moldova 77%, Balti in Moldova 71%, Buckingham in the UK 70%, 
PUE in Poland 42%), they are also lowest on the list for external research 
income (between 0% and 1% for Polish public and private, Moldavian public 
and private, and all other private case studies except for Buckingham at 
11%). This income structure determines the mission of institutions studied: 
teaching, in real rather than declarative terms, is becoming more important 
than research (except for promotion and career ladder reasons in the public 
sector) 5. 
In general, private institutions are able to compete for public or private 
research funds to a very limited degree; being largely teaching institutions 
(except for the two unique cases of Jönköping and Pereslavl), even if they are 
permitted by national laws to be state-subsidized in research, they are not 
able in practice to compete for funds with public universities. Separate units 
are rarely rewarded (or punished) for their entrepreneurialism and rarely 
act as separate business units, as is often the case with most successful public 
entrepreneurial universities. 
The strengthened steering core 
The role of the 'strengthened steering core' in entrepreneurialism of the 
private institutions studied is important. Clark's 'notoriously weak capacity 
to steer themselves', exhibited by traditional European universities (Clark, 
1998: 5), is not observable in the private sector studied. There does not 
appear to be any need for balancing influences across multiple levels of these 
institutions, or a need to keep a constant balance between particular 
departments through the intervention of the centre. In contrast to public 
entrepreneurial institutions (and even more, in contrast to the whole public 
sector in higher education), the role of faculty participation in central 
councils is severely reduced (here Buckingham is an exception). But, in 
general, collegial management is non-existent, and connections between 
academics and administrators/management/founders/owners are limited. 
As Clark observed about ambitious universities concerned about their 'mar-
ginality' and even 'survivability', they 'cannot depend on old habits of weak 
steering'. They need to become 'quicker, more flexible, and especially more 
focused in reactions to expanding and changing demands'. A strengthened 
steering core is a necessity — and it is prevalent in the private sector. 
The university centre is constantly dealing with risk, the management and 
understanding of which is crucial; and the risk, to manage on a daily basis, is 
the financial one (as the rector in the Russian case study of the University of 
Pereslavl put it, 'the university constantly encounters difficulties securing 
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basic daily needs . . . which demoralizes staff and distracts it from its mis-
sion') . The role of obtaining resources (through retaining or increasing the 
number of students) seems more important than the role of building reputa-
tion for the private institutions studied. In terms of management structures, 
as in public entrepreneurial universities, private institutions have powerful 
centres, strong management groups, usually comprising a few adminis-
trators. In decision making, the role of collegial bodies appears, in most 
cases, marginal (most often, if they nominally exist but only their formal 
approval of decisions taken is sought). Most private institutions do not use 
resource allocation procedures to make strategic choices about their future 
direction. Also, no major impact of a new bureaucracy is reported: both the 
number, and the role, of development officers, technology transfer experts, 
special staff managers, and fundraising officers is small. The role of strategic 
committees, so fundamental to managing the entrepreneurial universities 
studied (especially at Warwick and Nottingham), is minimal. In transition 
countries, a unique feature is that management in the private sector is deal-
ing, to a large extent, with academics also working (in a parallel manner) in 
the public sector (the Russian case of the small, regional, and private Uni-
versity of Pereslavl is a counter-example to this, as most academics working 
there are full-time professors — but this institution was born out of a former 
state-funded think tank of the Russian Academy of Sciences). Consequently, 
the fusion of managerial and academic values is both more and less feasible: 
more, because academics bring with them the traditional collegial attitudes 
prevalent in public institutions; less, because most of them come to the private 
sector not for research and teaching satisfaction but for financial reasons, and 
they can quit any time. In the other countries studied, this could not happen 
(the UK, Spain). The management structures are nominally three-level 
arrangements (centre—faculties—departments) but in practice they seem to be 
flat (centre—departments, as at Buckingham), and in smaller institutions, 
even centre—academics, with no intermediaries (WSHIG in Poland). 
In small private institutions, which have sometimes appeared out of 
nowhere, with no international investments or public subsidies involved, and 
which in their first years of operation had been constantly in danger of 
financial collapse (WSHIG in Poznan being a perfect example), both gov-
ernance and management structures and procedures may be simplified to 
the extreme. The culture of financial survival, as reported in Spain, Russia, 
Moldova, and Poland, has been very strong in these institutions. The con-
sequences for management styles and managerial practices are significant: 
most often, decisions are taken by one to five people only, there is almost no 
spirit of collegiality, and all major (and sometimes even most minor) 
decisions are actually taken by rectors/owners/founders; sometimes, as 
reported in the Russian case of Pereslavl, some collegiality is still reported. 
combined with what its rector calls: 
overall management ineffectiveness . . . in its purest sense, to connote 
weakness in organization of university activities. The development of 
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effectively operating offices is in process, while ill-prepared documents, 
inability to effectively process data and chaotic scheduling still chroni-
cally undermine the effectiveness of university management. (Pereslavl 
case study) 
These simplified management structures in most institutions studied seem 
to be possible only in relatively small institutions, with limited research ambi-
tions and those which are relatively non-competitive workplaces for the staff. 
There are virtually no research funds available to these institutions (either 
from private or from public sources) and consequently most academic 
decisions are relatively non-controversial and teaching-related. As in the 
Polish case of WSHIG: 
The Academy has a very stable organizational and management struc-
ture: the founder and the owner (Professor Roman Dawid Tauber) 
has been its rector in the whole period. All key decisions concerning 
WSHIG are taken by the rector. There is no Senate as the Academy is too 
small — but key academic decisions are confirmed by WSHIG's Scientific 
Board, meeting 3-4 times a year . . . The management team is small and 
very effective; it comprises rector and the three vice-rectors. All senior 
administrative staff, including vice-rectors, has been working for WSHIG 
for a decade or more. The key for the success of WSHIG is the loyalty of 
its staff, both administrative and academic . . In a small-size academic 
institution like WSHIG it is still possible for its rector to make all major 
decisions; and to make many minor decisions. (WSHIG case study) 
The role of strong core administrators — accompanied by strong strategic 
committees — is emphasized in many EUEREK (and other) case studies of 
European universities. Managing structures and decision-making processes 
at a small private university (University of Buckingham) are substantially 
different from those at bigger institutions (such as Warwick and Nottingham 
Universities in the UK or Twente University in the Netherlands). For example, 
each of the three schools at Buckingham is treated as a business division, 
with each responsible for maximizing its financial return (derived largely 
from teaching). The decision-making process at Buckingham is quick but 
there is also considerable space for collegiality — which makes it different 
from other private institutions. As the Director of Finance puts it: 
Buckingham has three academic Schools, and we look at them as three 
business divisions. Each is responsible for making the maximum finan-
cial return and growing their business. The decision-making process at 
the University is quick and comprises five people: the VC, his deputy and 
the three Deans. We meet every week for two to three hours, so we do 
make good progress and good academic decisions in that sense. We get 
on very well. (Buckingham case study) 
Academic entrepreneurialism involves risk-taking (Shattock, 2003; 
Williams, 2004a: 19); in most of the EUEREK case studies, institutions have 
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to deal with a high level of risk on a daily basis; in private institutions, the 
major risk studied is a financial one, related to student numbers (and stu-
dent fees). But as Shattock explains, 'risks [in universities] may be academic 
or reputational as well as financial' (Shattock, 2005: 19). The Polish case 
study of a medium-sized, vocationally orientated private institution (WSHIG -
Academy of Hotel Management in Poznan) explains: 
WSHIG has been operating under constant risk in recent years. The 
major risk has been financial — will the income from student fees cover 
the expenditures, especially including debt instalments to the banks. 
WSHIG has been investing heavily in its infrastructure. As other private 
institutions, only from its own sources, with no state subsidies. WSHIG's 
rector was doing wonders to be able to pay back the bank loans in 
time (also using his private assets). The second risk has been student 
enrolments. (WSHIG case study) 
At Buckingham, in a similar vein, what is meant by risk is financial risk: 
The most important risk to the University is financial. With a small 
research portfolio, academic risk is restricted to the student take up of 
degree programmes. In that sense the University is operating on a knife 
edge of risk. (Buckingham case study) 
There are also other forms of risk: competition in the areas of studies 
(public institutions suddenly opening the same specializations/programmes 
or modifying existing ones — and running them without charging student 
fees), state regulations, and prestige (reputation). As reported in Russia, the 
most important risk at Pereslavl is the possible future shortage of qualified 
professors, followed by the possibility of losing existing public funding for its 
research centre run by the Russian Academy of Sciences (the University 
itself lost its public funding in 2001). As the case study reveals, 'the university 
is in constant talks with the local administration and enterprises for extra 
funding but their support normally comes in kind' (Pereslavl case study). 
Finally, the risk for both public and private institutions can also be 
reputational. 
The extended developmental periphery 
The third element of entrepreneurial universities in Clark's formulation 
is their extended developmental periphery, units that 'more readily .than 
traditional academic departments, reach across university boundaries to link 
up with outside organizations and groups' (Clark, 1998: 6). This element 
appears quite limited in scope, operations, and importance at traditional 
universities. In the private sector studied, academic peripheries also play a 
very limited role: most case studies do not mention them at all. 
In universities generally, there is an increasing number of operating 
units that are not traditional, discipline-centred departments. These units in 
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particular take the form of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research 
centres focusing on a wide range of societal problems. The extended per-
iphery can also be units of teaching outreach, under such labels as continuing 
education, lifelong education, distance education, and professional devel-
opment. These research and teaching instruments cross old university bound-
aries to bring in new students and new kinds of research. Clark (1998) 
suggests that such base units have natural allies in the steering core — among 
agents of change located in the centre. These new entrepreneurial units 
fundamentally change the character of the university, adding new dimensions 
to traditional (departments—faculties—the centre) or newer, flatter structures 
(departments—centre). They require different management styles as they are 
often non-permanent, contract-funded units, staffed by non-tenured con-
tracted academics. These styles are more flexible and relationships between 
the centre and peripheral units become much less formal and less bureau-
cratic — one of the reasons is that these units at the peripheries are often 
where most outside research funds are being invested. 
The crucial role of these new research centres is overwhelming and uni-
versally reported. Research centres increasingly attract more outside fund-
ing in the form of grants and contracts. Their existence confirms a dual 
structure of most entrepreneurial institutions: traditional academic depart-
ments (and disciplines of teaching and research) and transdisciplinary and 
non-traditional research centres (and transdisciplinary research; sometimes 
teaching — but then mostly postgraduate programmes and short courses). 
These academic peripheries can come under the structure of departments, 
or be accountable directly to the centre (as is the case in Poland where most 
new research centres are accountable academically and financially directly to 
vice-rectors for research, avoiding hierarchies of departments and faculties, 
and deans and heads of departments, for example at AMU). 
The new peripheries take two basic forms: (a) new administrative offices 
and (b) new academic units. The appearance of new specialized administra-
tive offices is closely related to new tasks being undertaken and unknown to 
the institution in its traditional structures and funding opportunities. New 
offices (and posts) include: grants and contracts office, research and innov-
ation offices, and various offices related to new academic programmes, such as 
entrepreneurship support programmes as described below. Other new units 
mentioned by Clark (2004a: 86) include the office of industrial relations, the 
alumni offices, the retail services office, the conference and special events 
office, the continuing education office, and the capital projects office. They all 
make sense at entrepreneurial universities where they are all closely related 
to the third stream of university funding discussed above. Clark calls them new 
bureaucrats of change' — who increasingly replace old traditional civil servants 
in transforming public universities. New funding opportunities contribute to 
the emergence of new peripheral support units. The academic structure as 
reported by case studies on entrepreneurial universities is changing substan-
tially owing to these new peripheries, both academic and administrative. 
New boundary-spanning academic units (research centres and institutes) 
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link themselves much more easily to the outside world (and outside funding), 
in contrast to the traditional, disciplinary-centred departments. 
To summarize, the role of extended developmental peripheries in the 
private institutions studied is marginal; new transdisciplinary research centres 
are sometimes reported but they do not change the character of these 
institutions and their (rare as it is) existence does not lead to the intro-
duction of new management styles or new internal resource allocation 
procedures. They do not form parallel, increasingly powerful university 
structures. They do not seem to attract new sources of funding and they are 
not engaged in an aggressive search for new research areas, as in the public 
sector. Also, the role of new administrative units, so crucial to the public 
entrepreneurial institutions studied, by comparison, is marginal. Most new 
posts and new units in the public sector are related to new opportunities for 
research funding, or the exploitation of research results, innovation, inter-
national off-campus teaching, or royalty rights. In the private institutions 
studied, the need for these units is still very limited, although they do 
sometimes appear (offices for EU structural funds in Poland, EU research or 
Tempus officers in Russia and Ukraine, etc.). The balance of power in 
management is not changed by new peripheral research (or teaching) units. 
There are few people working on research grants, without employment 
contracts, and there is no need to have bridging policies ready for this staff 
category. They do not have major (or, in most cases, any) problems with 
managing intellectual property issues or consultancies. There do not seem to 
exist clear research targets and funding for particular units does not seem to 
be based on meeting the targets, or bringing additional research-related 
revenue to the institution. Consequently, at the moment, the extended 
developmental periphery is almost absent in the private sector in Europe, at 
least as revealed in our case studies. 
The stimulated academic heartland 
The fourth element of Clark's entrepreneurial universities recognizes that 
strong universities are built on strong academic departments. The accept-
ance of change by departments is critical. As Clark put it, for change to take 
hold, one department and faculty after another needs itself to become an 
entrepreneurial unit, reaching more strongly to the outside with new pro-
grams and relationships and promoting third-stream income' (Clark, 1998: 
7). Entrepreneurial universities become based on entrepreneurial depart-
ments. Research centres and institutes proliferate and may change the 
balance of power at an institution — they usually have greater opportunities 
for outside funding, and are directly related to the university management 
centre (also owing to their successes in attracting funding; this proximity to 
the centre, as reported by case studies, is most often informal). But apart 
from academic peripheries, traditional departments do count, and this is 
where most teaching and research is reported to be taking place. 
Entrepreneurialism and private higher education in Europe 113 
The issues of developing new knowledge from entrepreneurial activities, 
the dissemination of new knowledge, and knowledge exploitation and tech-
nology transfer mechanisms look quite similar in most of the private institu-
tion case studies. Except for the Swedish case of Jönköping, none of the 
institutions have science parks or significant (either public or private) 
research funds. Interviewees mention teaching, seminars, and books as their 
contribution to knowledge transfer. There is no major difference in this 
context between WSHIG in Poland, UCH in Spain, or the TCUM 
in Moldova: they are mostly teaching institutions, with a strong vocational 
component of studies. In the Spanish case, though, there is an idea to set up 
an Office for the Transfer of Research Results — and there are already two 
institutes where the dissemination of research work is located (Buckingham 
also intends to go in the same direction). In the Russian case, the strong 
research inclination of the Pereslavl faculty is emphasized, following its ori-
gins in the fundamental research of the local branch of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences. As the Polish case study explains about the role of research and 
teaching: 
WSHIG is a special case of fully professionally-oriented educational 
institution. Being both a private institution and an almost completely 
teaching (as opposed to teaching and research) institution, WSHIG 
does not intend — by its mission — to develop or disseminate new 
knowledge or intend to get involved in knowledge transfer . . . If any 
knowledge transfer could be mentioned, it would be the knowledge 
provided through short-term courses to professionals already working in 
the areas of studies represented by WSHIG. The role of research at 
WSHIG, both according to its mission and in practice, is marginal. But 
nevertheless WSHIG has published a few dozen books and collective 
volumes in its areas of interest. As a vocationally-oriented teaching insti-
tution, WSHIG does not see the reason to get involved in research not 
related to its major areas. (WSHIG case study) 
The private institutions studied do not have a strong 'academic heartland', as 
they are predominantly teaching institutions. 
In more general terms, and with respect to the public sector, entre-
preneurship is reported not to belong to a few disciplines or subject areas — it 
has come to characterize virtually all academic fields (and such universities 
as Twente and Warwick are the best examples here, even though they 
represent two extreme poles in management structures: decentralization 
and centralization). The following features from academic departments are 
reported to reveal their growing entrepreneurialism (the Warwick case): the 
melting of the periphery into the core; the extensive building of research 
centres under departments; the construction of a university-wide graduate 
school; and the introduction of an imaginative and highly attractive research 
fellowship scheme (Clark, 1998: 27). 
Both Clark's case studies and other European case studies of entrepreneu-
rial universities show that there is an uneven spread of entrepreneurialism 
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within an institution, with various rates of change, most often depending on 
external opportunities. While in Western Europe and the United States, 
apparently the most enterprising parts of traditional academia ( `academic 
heartland') are in the science and technology areas; in most transition 
countries, as confirmed by the case studies, the most entrepreneurially 
minded units, departments, and institutions, as well as academics, are those 
`soft' areas: economics, law and business, management, marketing, sociology, 
political sciences. These are the areas in which the largest part of the private 
sector operates, and in which the public sector runs its most enterprising 
study programmes for fee-paying students (all the Polish, Russian, and 
Moldovan EUEREK case studies confirm this tendency). Also, the availability 
of grants, including international research grants, in these areas is consider-
able. In transition economies, 'soft' disciplines, including economics and 
business and social sciences in particular, are much more easily fundable, 
and consequently are much more agents of entrepreneurial change in 
academic institutions. 
In the private institutions studied, a variety of forms of study are available 
(full-time, part-time, weekends) . Despite, at least in some countries, flexibility 
in opening new programmes wherever necessary, the content of study on 
offer seems to have been stable over the last 10 years, despite the frequently 
proposed need to expand the institutional profile. Thus WSHIG continues 
to teach mostly hospitality management and culinary arts, and Pereslavl 
continues to concentrate teaching on computing and mathematics; as the 
Pereslav's case study explains, 'more than ten years after the opening of 
the university, it did not expand dramatically in terms of enrolment or 
courses', and its rector mentions 'the most common feature of the Pereslavl 
university is single-sector orientation'). No major changes in governance 
and organizational structures in the last 10 years were reported in the 
majority of institutions studied. They provide wide opportunities for on-the-
job training and work experience for a large proportion of students (espe-
cially in Poland, UK, Russia, and Spain). There are often people with 
professional prestige (non-academics) among part-time staff. The feeling 
of being disadvantaged compared with the public institutions is reported 
in interviews (especially with respect to research funding). They have a 
record of appointing their own graduates to staff or faculty positions: in 
2005, 80% of administrative staff in WSHIG and 30% of academic faculty 
at the University of Pereslavl were their own graduates. The institutions 
are most often ineligible for public funding: Poland (both for teaching 
and research), UK (for teaching), Russia (both for teaching and research), 
and Spain (for teaching). Jönköping is exceptional in being eligible for 
public funds both for teaching and research. Often, eligibility for public 
research grants in theory does not mean that research grants are awarded 
in practice, because of losing out in competition with elite public research 
universities. 
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Institution-wide, integrated 
entrepreneurial culture 
The last element of the entrepreneurial university within Clark's framework 
is the 'entrepreneurial culture'. 'Enterprising universities . . . develop a 
work culture that embraces change' (Clark, 1998: 7). Organizational culture, 
seen as the realm of ideas, beliefs, and asserted values, is the symbolic side 
of the material components featured in the first four elements, Clark claims. 
It may start as a (relatively simple) institutional idea that is later elaborated 
into a set of beliefs and finally becomes the culture of the institution. It 
is a crucial component for entrepreneurial transformations, the first four 
elements being merely the means. In the case studies analysed, the founding 
idea was 'the earned income' concept as conceived at the University of 
Warwick after the Thatcher financial cuts over 20 years ago; the idea of 
`the entrepreneurial university' as conceived vaguely at Twente; the idea 
of commitment to 'innovation' back in the 1980s at Chalmers University 
of Technology in Sweden (and its opting-out of the Swedish state system 
in 1994); the idea of following 'northern issues' at Lapland University, 
as reported in the case study; and the idea of rejecting state funds and 
state bureaucracy at the foundation of Buckingham University. Sometimes 
the emergent culture stems from individual visions, as reported in many 
institutions in the transition countries. WSHIG in Poland, whose founder 
and owner wished education in the catering industry, the culinary arts, 
and hospitality management to be made available at a higher education 
level, which was not available when he was getting his education in Poland, 
is a good example of how an individual's idea can be transformed into 
a complete institutional culture within a decade a half. Another example 
comes from the University of Pereslavl in Russia, where strong leadership 
and the idea of its first rector (after whom the university is named today) to 
transform a state research centre in software and computing founded back 
in 1984 led to the opening of a small private university answering to the 
demands of the city and its enterprises in 1993, following Russian market 
reforms in other areas. The importance of sharing a vision for an institution 
is reported in the case studies as being very important. The role of sharing a 
vision is confirmed at LSHTM at London University: 
Many people in this School are very altruistic, they are interested in the 
School's mission, improvement of health worldwide. They really believe in it, 
that's what motivates them. You have to be creative and inventive to be able 
to do that, you have to keep your research and funding going. If that is 
entrepreneurialism, then we are good at that. (LSHTM case study, 
emphasis added) 
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Conclusions 
Let us summarize our conclusions about the academic entrepreneurialism of 
private higher education institutions point by point. 
1. The case study private institutions generally view themselves as less 
entrepreneurial than the public ones. Their access to research funds (espe-
cially public) — which most often heralds the appearance of the entre-
preneurial culture — is very limited. But they are often very successful teaching 
institutions. Their major concern is to survive financially as they are heavily 
dependent on student fees and they experience fluctuations in enrolments. 
Their mission and strategy are self-determined rather than influenced by state 
policies, and it is usually difficult to embark on institutional transformations. 
No major relationships between changes in governance and organizational 
structures and the emergence of entrepreneurialism were reported. The 
major source of non-core/non-state funding in almost all cases is student 
fees; no major changes in income structures were reported in recent years 
(Buckingham is exceptional here because of its higher level of research 
funding and recent focus on third mission activities). No major academic 
risks are being taken by staff and institutions, but often financial risks are 
taken by institutions. Compared with the public sector, few examples of the 
development of new knowledge from entrepreneurial activities are reported. 
Apart from teaching, few examples of other major kinds of dissemination of 
knowledge are reported. Also, only a limited number of mechanisms of 
knowledge transfer/knowledge exploitation are reported. Generally, there 
is a non-supportive climate for developing knowledge exploitation (addition-
ally, they are mostly teaching institutions) . There is competition with other 
institutions mostly for students (and for their fees) and not in research. 
Financial incentives or award systems for staff are generally marginal. Inhibi-
tors to entrepreneurialism have clearly national dimensions (different his-
tory and tradition, reasons to found an institution, funding regimes). 
2. In general, having a diversified funding base does not seem to work for 
the private institutions studied. Their ability (and opportunities) to use the 
`third source' of income, especially (perhaps most welcome) 'university-
generated' income, are very limited (and these characteristics bring them 
close to public institutions in the transition countries) . Their high financial 
dependence on a single source of income makes them easily prone to 
financial problems. In general, they are able to compete for public or private 
research funds in a very limited way; being largely teaching institutions, they 
are not able in practice to compete with public universities. Separate units 
are rarely rewarded (or punished) for their entrepreneurialism and rarely 
act as separate business units, as is often the case with most successful public 
entrepreneurial universities. They do not seem to have incentive policies to 
support their staff in seeking non-core sources of income — income other than 
student fees. They do not have access to government funds — but also most 
often do not have access to government agencies as sources of third-stream 
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income or to private organized sources (such as business firms, philanthropic 
foundations, etc.) and do not use policies to support university-generated 
income. The share of their income from alumni fundraising, research con-
tracts, patents, endowments, or earned income from campus operations is 
negligible, in most cases not even marginal. There is no mutual feeding and 
encouragement between non-core sources of income. There is also no major 
need to keep complicated resource allocation formulae in funding particular 
departments, or the need to keep a fair balance between the centre and the 
units through elaborate top-slicing and cross-subsidizing techniques. In the 
context of a diversified funding base, if entrepreneurialism is to be taken 
seriously in the private sector, the non-core income would be the income 
from any other sources than student fees, leading to a lower dependence on 
this currently single most important source. 
3. The role of the 'strengthened steering core' in entrepreneurialism in 
private institutions is significant but there does not seem to be the need for 
balancing influences across multiple levels of these institutions, and there 
does not appear to be a need to keep a constant balance between particular 
departments through the intervention of the centre. In contrast to public 
entrepreneurial institutions, the role of faculty participation in central 
councils is severely reduced. Collegial management is rare, and connections 
between academics and administrators/management/founders/owners are 
limited. The centre is constantly dealing with risk, the management and 
understanding of which is crucial; and the risk, to manage on a daily basis, is 
the financial one. The role of attracting resources (through retaining or 
increasing the number of students) is more important than the role of 
building a reputation for the private institutions studied. In terms of man-
agement structures, as in public entrepreneurial universities, private institu-
tions have powerful centres, strong management groups, usually comprising 
a small group of administrators. In decision-making, the role of collegial 
bodies is, in most cases, marginal. Most private institutions do not use 
resource allocation procedures to make strategic choices about their future 
direction. Also, no major impact of a new bureaucracy is reported: both the 
number and the role of development officers, technology transfer experts, 
special staff managers, and fundraising officers is small. The role of strate-
gic committees, so fundamental for managing entrepreneurial universities, 
seems minimal. In the transition countries, a unique feature is that man-
agement in the private sector is concerned, to a large extent, with academics 
working (in a parallel manner) in the public sector. The management 
structures are nominally three-level arrangements (
centre—faculties-departments) but in practice they seem to be flat (centre—departments), and 
in smaller institutions even centre—academics, with no intermediaries. 
4. The role of 'extended developmental peripheries' in the EUEREK 
private institutions studied is marginal; new transdisciplinary research 
centres are sometimes reported but they do not change the character of 
these institutions and their existence does not lead to the introduction of 
new management styles or new internal resource allocation procedures. 
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They do not form parallel, increasingly powerful university structures. They 
do not seem to attract new sources of funding and are not engaged in aggres-
sively searching for new research areas. Also, the role of new administrative 
units, so crucial to public entrepreneurial institutions studied, is marginal in 
comparison. Most new posts and new units in the public sector are related to 
new opportunities for research funding, the exploitation of research results, 
innovation, international off-campus teaching, royalty rights, and so on. In 
the private institutions studied, the need for these units is still very small. The 
balance of power in management is not changed by new peripheral research 
(or teaching) units. There are few people working on research grants, with-
out employment contracts, and there is no need to have bridging policies 
(as, for example, at LSHTM) ready for this staff category. They do not have 
major (or, in most cases, any) problems with managing intellectual property 
issues or consultancies. There do not seem to be clear research targets and 
funding for particular units does not appear to be based on meeting targets, 
or bringing additional research-related revenue to the institution. Con-
sequently, at the moment, the extended developmental periphery appears 
almost absent from the private sector in Europe, at least as regards the 
EUEREK case studies. 
5. Almost all private institutions studied are involved only marginally in 
research. Competition with public institutions, in the context of a general 
lack of access (in theory or in practice) to public research funds, means 
competition for students and their fees. The second factor relevant for the 
mission and strategy of the private institutions studied is uncertainty about 
student enrolments — as enrolments may be going down or be fluctuating. 
Among the public institutions, despite internal competition, entrepreneurial 
universities report a high degree of internal cooperation, especially in grant 
applications, which appears not to be the case in private institutions. Because 
access to research funds is very limited, so is both internal and external 
competition. Cooperation seems to concern teaching rather than any other 
activities. The role of competition at public entrepreneurial universities is 
widely reported to be crucial. The competition is mostly for research funds, 
especially external sources of income. The overall effect of growing competi-
tion in sciences and the humanities alike is reported in the case studies as 
extremely positive, even though the picture for universities that are the 
most successful in this differs substantially from that of traditional, non-
competitive academic institutions. There is a strong implication from the 
vast majority of the case studies that without competition for funds, entre-
preneurial universities would not become entrepreneurial, even though they 
could be top in their respective disciplines and excellent in research and 
teaching. Private institutions do not take part in this race for external 
funding. 
6. The use of the concept of 'entrepreneurialism' for the study of private 
institutions requires further adaptations. In the case studies analysed, of 
Clark's five constitutive elements of the entrepreneurial university, perhaps 
two or three could be said to exist: the strengthened steering core, the 
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integrated entrepreneurial culture, and perhaps, in some cases only, the 
stimulated academic heartland. No diversified funding appears to have been 
reported, and no extended peripheries were observed. 
Notes 
1. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Michael Shattock for the extended 
comments he made on the draft of this chapter. All limitations are my sole 
responsibility, however. 
2. Throughout the text, and especially in its conclusions, two exceptional cases 
need to be borne in mind: Pereslavl is not a standard teaching-orientated private 
university in Russia due to its historical origins in, and current affiliation with, 
the Russian Academy of Sciences; and Jönköping University has been a nominally 
non-state - foundation-based - Swedish university with equal access to public 
funding. Thus in the majority of generalizations about private institutions, 
Jönköping University does not fit, so unless otherwise stated, the Swedish case is 
separate - the most important difference is that Jönköping University does not 
charge student fees and has full access to public research and teaching funds, 
which, from a comparative perspective, makes it similar to public sector institu-
tions. It has a similar status to Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden as 
analysed by Clark: nominally a private institution, with full access to public 
funding on equal terms with other public universities (Clark, 1998: 84-102 and 
Clark, 2004a: 61-70). 
3. The public sector, to a large extent, has produced the private sector there 
(through academic faculty using parallel employment opportunities), at least 
initially, instead of reforming itself. The privatization of higher education often 
meant the creation of (new) private institutions by the faculty from the public 
sector (and Poland, Russia, and Moldova are good examples). Questions concern-
ing the legitimacy of new arrivals to the educational arena have been raised from 
the very beginning, especially in some transition countries where private uni-
versities were born in a sort of post-1989 legal vacuum. But the common feature in 
most of those transition countries with substantial enrolments in the private sector 
is the interplay of cooperation and competition: even though private institutions 
themselves compete with public ones, they most often share with their competitors 
the majority of their faculty. 
4. In Poland, both the public and private sectors rely heavily on student fees; from a 
comparative perspective, fees constitute about 20% of the overall budget of the 
public sector institutions and 95% of the overall budget of the private sector 
institutions. For the public sector, the other sources of income include state 
subsidies for teaching (50-60% on average in 2002) and research subsidies 
(about 15%). Consequently, private institutions are almost wholly dependent on 
student fees, 
5. To explain the Polish example: the proportion of income by source of income is 
highly diversified according to the type of institution. In 2004, in public technical 
institutions, the proportion of income from teaching was 75.1% and from research 
20.5%; for universities it was 85.2% and 10.6%, and for universities of economics 
90.0% and 5.1%. Public institutions are much more deeply involved in research 
activities than are private institutions, for most of which research is a side activity 
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both in terms of academic mission and in terms of funding. The structure of 
income from teaching activities according to sources of funding for teaching 
shows that the main source of funding in public institutions is from the state 
budget (71.2%), followed by tuition fees (21.8%) and other sources (6.9%). In 
private institutions, the main source of income from teaching activities is tuition 
fees (97%). Generally, over 80% of all income from teaching goes to public 
institutions (82.1%); also, all state subsidies (100%) go to public institutions and 
slightly more than a half (50.7%) of all income from student fees goes to public 
institutions as well. 
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